Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Mythologies
The one topic that confused me the most was when Barthes started talking about the difference between Left-Wing myth and bourgeois myth: "Yes, myth exists on the Left, but it does not at all have there the same qualities as bourgeois myth. Left-wing is inessential." This is where I went from kind of getting it to being completely lost. Presumably Barthes is talking about the left wing of of politics in France at the time he was writing this. Is the left wing the same as the poor that Barthes mentions who also have inferior myths? If myth is a social fact, how can myth as used by some people be more important or essential then when used by others? Does he mean that while bourgeois myths like the wedding become naturalized, left wing or poor myths do not? It seems to me that categorizing the linguistics and myths of an entire class of people as inferior is a very broad generalization. Can't the working class have their own myths separate from the bourgeoisie?
The Subjective Nature of Myth
When reading Barthes' Mythologies, I was somewhat confused about the nature of myth, particularly whether or not it is subjective.
On page 116 when describing the picture of the French soldier, he writes:
"On the cover, a young Negro in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour. All this is the meaning of the picture. But, whether naively or not, I see very well what it signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors."
His use of the first-person pronouns "I" and "me" brings forth a few questions. The signified is what Barthes describes as his personal perception; the language he uses made it difficult for me to view the signified as an objective entity (As a side note - the whole emphasis on language and connotation in these readings gives me intense anxiety regarding my word choice). Barthes then uses the words "signified" and "concept" interchangeably, but in the language the concept is more concrete than the abstract and mental signifier.
I guess my question is if a myth is so largely composed of what we perceive as the signified, then how can a myth be as objective as Barthes seems to insist that it is? From my reading, the myth seems to be entirely more subjective, more mental, affected by so many more variables than language. The myth seems to be somewhat metaphysical by nature, which, Barthes states, semiology is not (112).
On page 116 when describing the picture of the French soldier, he writes:
"On the cover, a young Negro in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour. All this is the meaning of the picture. But, whether naively or not, I see very well what it signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors."
His use of the first-person pronouns "I" and "me" brings forth a few questions. The signified is what Barthes describes as his personal perception; the language he uses made it difficult for me to view the signified as an objective entity (As a side note - the whole emphasis on language and connotation in these readings gives me intense anxiety regarding my word choice). Barthes then uses the words "signified" and "concept" interchangeably, but in the language the concept is more concrete than the abstract and mental signifier.
I guess my question is if a myth is so largely composed of what we perceive as the signified, then how can a myth be as objective as Barthes seems to insist that it is? From my reading, the myth seems to be entirely more subjective, more mental, affected by so many more variables than language. The myth seems to be somewhat metaphysical by nature, which, Barthes states, semiology is not (112).
Structuralism in relation to the Age of Mechanical Reproduction
I find the mechanism of myth to be similar to that of camera in the age of mechanical reproduction. If I understand correctly, the qualities of myth -- the versatility, mutability, distortions that lead to possibilities of characters of the signification -- strike a resemblance to the possibilities of film and the reproducibility as discussed by Benyamin. Consider the two passages that follow:
"Myth is a value, truth is no guarantee for it; nothing prevents it from being a perpetual alibi: it is enough that its signifier has two sides for it always to have an 'elsewhere' at its disposal. The meaning is always there to present the form; the form is always there to outdistance the meaning."
p228, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction by Benyamin
"The film has not yet realized its true meaning, its real possibilities... these consist in its unique faculty to express by natural means and with incomparable persuasiveness all that is fairylike, marvelous, supernatural"
"...The sequence of positional views which the editor composes from the material supplied him constitutes the completed film. It comprises certain factors of movement which are in reality those of the camera, not to mention special camera angles, close-ups, etc. Hence the performance of the actor is subjected to a series of optical tests... The audience's identification with the actor is really an identification with the camera"
(As discussed by Professor Chun, such analysis implies that an actor is merely a 'prop,' but nonetheless allows for opportunities for the mass to become an actor.
I would like to explore the idea of possibilities behind myth and camera of mechanical reproduction. (And their adaptability to history and situations.) Perhaps it is a bit farfetching and requires further elaboration - but I think the logic is worth comparing.
change in language vs. mythology
In reference to Saussure and the nature of linguistics-- the sign is arbitrary. There is no reason why a tree should be called a tree. The signifier is brought upon the sign slowly, because of passing time, repetition, and tradition. Because language is based on arbitrary signs, there is no logical founding in the sign, and this renders language virtually impossible to discuss and/or change intentionally. Rather, language changes slowly, as a product of the slight day-to-day differences and modernizing community.
This makes perfect sense to me. One cannot purposefully change language, because there is no sensible reason for this change. Change comes about by chance. I am confused, however, as to how changes are brought about in mythology. Myth, as we have learned through the lectures and readings, seems to be a reflection of history; history is embedded into the structure of the existing mythology. If myth is supposed to be a product of history--a "radical denial or transformation" of history, then I am confused as to who, what, when and where the changing and embedding of history into the myth occurs.
Does this parallel the change that comes about in language? Or does it contradict it?
This makes perfect sense to me. One cannot purposefully change language, because there is no sensible reason for this change. Change comes about by chance. I am confused, however, as to how changes are brought about in mythology. Myth, as we have learned through the lectures and readings, seems to be a reflection of history; history is embedded into the structure of the existing mythology. If myth is supposed to be a product of history--a "radical denial or transformation" of history, then I am confused as to who, what, when and where the changing and embedding of history into the myth occurs.
Does this parallel the change that comes about in language? Or does it contradict it?
What images make good myths?
"What the concept distorts is of course what is full, the meaning: the lion and the Negro are deprived of their history, changed into gestures. What Latin exemplarity distorts is the naming of the lion, in all its contingency; and what French imperiality obscures is also a primary language, a factual discourse which was telling me about the salute of a Negro in uniform. But this distortion is not an obliteration: the lion and the Negro remain here, the concept needs them; they are half-amputated, they are deprived of memory, not of existence: they are at once stubborn, silently rooted there, and garrulous, a speech wholly at the service of the concept. The concept, literally, deforms, but does not abolish the meaning; a word can perfectly render this contradiction: it alienates it."
I was rather intrigued by the idea that in a myth, the signification is deprived of the original historical context of the signifier. Professor Chung touched on this in class. She showed us three images from presidential campaigns. The image of John McCain standing casually with some anonymous "local law enforcement officials," all of whom happened to be black, functioned well as a myth because of the anonymity of the image-- the people in it and the specific place did not seem important, so it was easy to focus on its message. The same went for the image of Obama, looking friendly and posing for a snapshot with two elderly, white women. But the image of John Kerry in Vietnam did not work so well to convey the message of Kerry as a soldier, precisely because it was too easily placed back into its original historical context. It sparked a debate about what was actually going on at the time the photo was taken, and what was Kerry's career as a soldier actually like.
This got me thinking about what kinds of images make good myths, and what we do to images to deprive them of their historical context so that we might use them more effectively as myths. The first image that came to mind was this ubiquitous one of Che Guevara.
Here, the signifier is Che Guevara, and the signified has to do with communism and the Cuban Revolution (although, lately, the image has lost a lot of its power due to overuse-- I'd go so far as to say that in our particular historical moment, seeing Che on a t-shirt is more likely to evoke thoughts of counterculture and anti-capitalism). The signification, therefore, is Che seen through this lens of communism and counterculture, or Che as a symbol of revolution and communism. The cropping of this image, seen not just on t-shirts, but on posters and all sorts of other things as well, not only cuts him off at the neck and deprives him of background, but also sort of washes out the details of his face with heightened contrast.
The original photograph from which this famous image was lifted looks like this.
This image sends a completely different message. To begin with, his face has all the detail of a human, as opposed to an icon, and he is given back the rest of his shoulders. But, more importantly, there is a palm tree in the background, and there is someone else in the photograph. Whether or not you know that this photograph was taken in 1960 by Alberto Korda at a memorial service in Havana for victims of the explosion of a freighter ship in Havana harbor, Che is immediately placed in an historical situation. He is standing in front of a palm tree. There is someone next to him. He is looking at something, not just into the distance.
The image of Che as we think of him functions well as a symbol of communism and revolution because its historical significance was literally cropped off the sides.
Anyway, I hope I haven't strayed too far from the original reading. This was just something that popped into my head while I was reading about images functioning as myths.
I was rather intrigued by the idea that in a myth, the signification is deprived of the original historical context of the signifier. Professor Chung touched on this in class. She showed us three images from presidential campaigns. The image of John McCain standing casually with some anonymous "local law enforcement officials," all of whom happened to be black, functioned well as a myth because of the anonymity of the image-- the people in it and the specific place did not seem important, so it was easy to focus on its message. The same went for the image of Obama, looking friendly and posing for a snapshot with two elderly, white women. But the image of John Kerry in Vietnam did not work so well to convey the message of Kerry as a soldier, precisely because it was too easily placed back into its original historical context. It sparked a debate about what was actually going on at the time the photo was taken, and what was Kerry's career as a soldier actually like.
This got me thinking about what kinds of images make good myths, and what we do to images to deprive them of their historical context so that we might use them more effectively as myths. The first image that came to mind was this ubiquitous one of Che Guevara.
Here, the signifier is Che Guevara, and the signified has to do with communism and the Cuban Revolution (although, lately, the image has lost a lot of its power due to overuse-- I'd go so far as to say that in our particular historical moment, seeing Che on a t-shirt is more likely to evoke thoughts of counterculture and anti-capitalism). The signification, therefore, is Che seen through this lens of communism and counterculture, or Che as a symbol of revolution and communism. The cropping of this image, seen not just on t-shirts, but on posters and all sorts of other things as well, not only cuts him off at the neck and deprives him of background, but also sort of washes out the details of his face with heightened contrast.The original photograph from which this famous image was lifted looks like this.
This image sends a completely different message. To begin with, his face has all the detail of a human, as opposed to an icon, and he is given back the rest of his shoulders. But, more importantly, there is a palm tree in the background, and there is someone else in the photograph. Whether or not you know that this photograph was taken in 1960 by Alberto Korda at a memorial service in Havana for victims of the explosion of a freighter ship in Havana harbor, Che is immediately placed in an historical situation. He is standing in front of a palm tree. There is someone next to him. He is looking at something, not just into the distance.
The image of Che as we think of him functions well as a symbol of communism and revolution because its historical significance was literally cropped off the sides.
Anyway, I hope I haven't strayed too far from the original reading. This was just something that popped into my head while I was reading about images functioning as myths.
I Think I Get It Now?
After struggling with this text for a good portion of my day I came across this lovely analogy on page 123 which I feel compelled to share out of its incredible illustrative powers:
"And there is never any contradiction, conflict, or split between the meaning and the form: they are never at the same place. In the same way if I am in the car and I looked at the scenery through the window-pane. At one moment I grasp the the presence of the glass and the distance of the landscape; at another, on the contrary, the transparence of the glass and the depth of the landscape; but the result of this alternation is constant: the glass is at once present and empty to me, and the landscape unreal and full...its form is empty but present, its meaning absent but full."
I love this passage because Barthes illustrates the illusory trap of the myth to the reader. As I interpret it, the form is the window to the meaning while at the same time the two blur/mask each other's presence by forcing the reader to focus on one aspect at a time, allowing the myth to be in a constant state of variable interpretation. Thus the two can only be put together by recognizing the myth as a whole, or by becoming the "mythologist" as Barthes puts it. I found the whole glass landscape thing to be a perfect segue into film as a visual myth which controls the focus of itself by manipulation of the lens focal depth and angle :D
Along the lines of what miz stone said about myth being countered by another myth, I get the gist of the concept but I need some clarification on Barthe's whole bouvard-and-pecuchet-ity thing on page 136...Forgive me if I'm being an idiot but I think the main issue was cultural references to which I'm oblivious like Viollet-le-Duc...
Naturalization
“Myth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion. [. . .] Entrusted with 'glossing over' an intentional concept, myth encounters nothing but betrayal in language, for language can only obliterate the concept if it hides it, or unmask if it formulates it. The elaboration of a second-order semiological system will enable myth to escape this dilemma: driven to having either to unveil or to liquidate the concept, it will naturalize it.” (129)
Barthes' focus on the myths' propensity to naturalize history, or as I interpret it, make historical context appear at the only possible formation of a system, is particularly interesting. It implies first, and foremost, an instantaneous processing of the myth. One must absorb and accept the sign instantaneously for Barthes' naturalization to occur. While this is a reasonable expectation, it raises the question of whether a myth exists to one who analyzes a form presented to them. Doesn't the act of analysis involve enumerating all the possible concepts embodied in that form, and therefor a blurring of the naturalized history?
Barthes' focus on the myths' propensity to naturalize history, or as I interpret it, make historical context appear at the only possible formation of a system, is particularly interesting. It implies first, and foremost, an instantaneous processing of the myth. One must absorb and accept the sign instantaneously for Barthes' naturalization to occur. While this is a reasonable expectation, it raises the question of whether a myth exists to one who analyzes a form presented to them. Doesn't the act of analysis involve enumerating all the possible concepts embodied in that form, and therefor a blurring of the naturalized history?
And the writer only knows...
" Take a bunch of roses: I use it to signify my passion. Do we have here, then only a signifier and a signified, the roses and my passion? Not even that: to put it accurately, there are here only 'passionified' roses….. Naturally, there are between the signifier, the signified and the sign, functional implications (such as that of the part to the whole) which are so close that to analyze them may seem futile." (113)
After reading "The Romans in Films" , I was particularly intrigued with the idea of how the creator (or anyone with authority over the matter at stake) can add a meaning to what he is controlling. For example, the smooth-faced, unperturbed and water tight Caesar, who seems to remain this way because he is the only one who does not know what is to happen to him. While Marc Anthony, Brutus, Cassius, and Casca are perspiring through every pore with the intensity and emotion of the situation. We can immediately relate to what is happening; we feel the intensity as they do, and yet, remain completely clueless like Caesar.
However, how is it that we interpret it the way they want us to see it? Like Barthes said, "it is this constant game of hide-and-seek between the meaning and the form which defines myth." (118) He then goes on to say that "it is the reader of myths himself who must reveal their essential function." (129) This is true. When we see Marc Anthony's face of anxiety, we all jump to our own experiences. Someone remembers the time they forgot the project which counted for half of their grade was due and had to skip two class periods and lunch to get it done; while someone else remembers that dreaded March 31st as they waited for midnight, hoping to log into their Brown account and getting good news. Whatever we think of, we get the idea of anxiety, and the creator accomplishes their job which I find truly fascinating.
The creator can not always succeed and sometimes the reader reveals a different definition. This reminds me of 2004's democratic hopeful Howard Dean's infamous scream . If you don't recall, Dean was the only person with any probability of beating Bush. However, one "Yeah!" and a hoarse voice gave Americans a scream that they related to their worst demented experience. Just one different interpretation lost him the election (or at least ruined it enough for him that Kerry could now take the lead.)
Perhaps I'm missing the idea behind this lecture, but one thing is for sure, isn't it just fascinating how the separation of myths from history can help us relate to them in our ways. Imagine what you could do with that!
After reading "The Romans in Films" , I was particularly intrigued with the idea of how the creator (or anyone with authority over the matter at stake) can add a meaning to what he is controlling. For example, the smooth-faced, unperturbed and water tight Caesar, who seems to remain this way because he is the only one who does not know what is to happen to him. While Marc Anthony, Brutus, Cassius, and Casca are perspiring through every pore with the intensity and emotion of the situation. We can immediately relate to what is happening; we feel the intensity as they do, and yet, remain completely clueless like Caesar.
However, how is it that we interpret it the way they want us to see it? Like Barthes said, "it is this constant game of hide-and-seek between the meaning and the form which defines myth." (118) He then goes on to say that "it is the reader of myths himself who must reveal their essential function." (129) This is true. When we see Marc Anthony's face of anxiety, we all jump to our own experiences. Someone remembers the time they forgot the project which counted for half of their grade was due and had to skip two class periods and lunch to get it done; while someone else remembers that dreaded March 31st as they waited for midnight, hoping to log into their Brown account and getting good news. Whatever we think of, we get the idea of anxiety, and the creator accomplishes their job which I find truly fascinating.
The creator can not always succeed and sometimes the reader reveals a different definition. This reminds me of 2004's democratic hopeful Howard Dean's infamous scream . If you don't recall, Dean was the only person with any probability of beating Bush. However, one "Yeah!" and a hoarse voice gave Americans a scream that they related to their worst demented experience. Just one different interpretation lost him the election (or at least ruined it enough for him that Kerry could now take the lead.)
Perhaps I'm missing the idea behind this lecture, but one thing is for sure, isn't it just fascinating how the separation of myths from history can help us relate to them in our ways. Imagine what you could do with that!
Mythologies
Barthes defines mythologies as second-order myths.
He writes on page 135: "Truth to tell, the best weapon against myth is perhaps to mythify it in its turn, and to produce an artificial myth: and this reconstituted myth will in fact be a mythology."
To mythify a myth, Barthes suggests that we must use the signification of our first myth as the first term in a new semiological chain which will ultimately result in a mythology.
This seems to make sense, but I wonder if motivation is a factor here. I was under the impression that meanings could be emptied into forms due to the arbitrariness of first-order language. Because myths are always necessarily motivated (not arbitrary), how is it that the signification produced by a first-order myth may be converted into empty form for a mythology?
Response to Barthes
In the section The bourgeoisie as a joint-stock company (p. 137-142), Barthes repeatedly refers to the bourgeoisie and bourgeois ideology, but never does a very good job of defining either. I know what bourgeoisie means in a general context, but I feel like he is using it in a very specific way--and one which he doesn't seem to adequately flesh out (either that, or I just missed and/or misunderstood it). He gives a brief description of what he means on page 142, towards the end of this section:
"bourgeois ideology is of the scientistic or the intuitive kind, it records facts or perceives values, but refuses explanations; the order of the world can be seen as sufficient or ineffable, it is never seen as significant."
Though this and a few other parts in this section give a bit of an explanation of what Barthes means, I'm still not entirely sure how he's defining bourgeois ideology. It definitely has to do with this scientific viewpoint as he mentions in that quote, and also is tied with the concepts of capitalism and consumerism. But, does he mean anything else in addition to that? Is there any way to formulate in a concise manner exactly what he means by bourgeois ideology?
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